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offenders attending a match. Police displacement during home games increases 
property crime by 7 percentage points for every extra 10,000 supporters in areas left 
under-protected.  
 
 
 
Keywords: Crime; Police Displacement; Self-Incapacitation; Football Matches 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a – Corresponding Address: Department of Economics, GSBE and ROA, Maastricht 
University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands. Tel: +31 43 388 84605 
o.marie@maastrichtuniversity.nl ; b - Centre for Economic Performance (CEP), London 
School of Economics, United Kingdom; c - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn, 
Germany; d - CESifo Group, Munich, Germany 
 1 
“If I were involved in criminality of a more sophisticated kind… would I not work on 
the assumption that the police will be fully occupied in a particular city - it will not be 
difficult to find out when these premiership games are being played - and I could go 
about my unlawful business?” 
 
Question by Mr David Winnick MP to the House of Commons Home Affairs 
Committee “The Cost of Policing Football”, 16 June 2009.  
  
 
1. Introduction 
 
The impact on local crime rates of hosting large sporting events is complex. It is not 
limited to the documented increases in violence resulting from (i) the concentration of 
hostile fans. One must also consider the impact on criminal behaviour of:  (ii) the 
displacement of police personnel sent to monitor the event and (iii) the voluntary 
incapacitation of a substantial number of individuals who are attending it. Still, most 
research on this issue has focused on documenting and studying aggressive fan 
behaviour. This literature has attempted to explain the reasons for the recurring 
problem of crowd violence during sporting events (see review by Young 2002) with 
special attention to the phenomenon of hooliganism associated with European football  
(Dunning et al. 1988) which reached its peak in the 1980s. One of several aims of this 
research will be to investigate if a similar relationship can be observed during or after 
football matches because of the geographical concentration of rival fans. We are also 
interested in other possible indirect impacts that hosting sporting events could have on 
local crime and especially property and other nonviolent offences. This could stem 
from the possible displacement of law enforcement personnel sent to police a game 
which could leave other areas under-protected. Another effect is that of some potential 
offender being voluntarily incapacitated while attending a game.  
In this paper we estimate the overall impact of hosting a sporting event on local 
crime taking into account all these possible impacts on offending behaviour. Because 
the relationship described is relatively complex, we first develop a conceptual 
framework to disentangle the different effects through which match attendance and 
police displacement affect crime. While it is difficult to exactly estimate the 
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respective impact of concentration, displacement, and self-incapacitation on crime, we 
can assess their relative influence by making some simple assumptions on their likely 
impact on various types of offences during either home or away matches. This 
strategy of differentiating between property and violent crimes is inspired by the work 
of Jacobs and Lefgren (2003) on the impact of school attendance on juvenile 
offending. They found that concentration of youths when school is in session 
increased violent crime but also led to drops in property crime that they attribute to a 
self-incapacitation effect. With sporting events we can assume that offending 
behaviour could be affected in a relatively similar manner. We can also consider the 
difference in impact of the local team playing at home and away since police 
displacement should only occur when the event is hosted in the area. Finally we can 
treat each match according to the size of the fan population they attract. When the 
game is being played away this should only have an impact on the potential numbers 
of offenders incapacitated during the game. As Dahl and DellaVigna (2009) point out 
in their study of the impact of violent movies on violent crime, the size of an audience 
should matter more for criminal behaviour if there is self-selection into attendance. 
We argue that football fans are a non-random sample of the population with 
demographic characteristics making them more prone to be potential offenders. 
Combining all these assumptions we can identify each of the three channels through 
which sporting events could impact on crime separately. 
To empirically investigate this question, we gathered information on the home 
and away matches of the nine major London football teams with stadiums located in 
seven different boroughs of the city. We have matched this data to hourly recorded 
crime from the Metropolitan Crime Statistics System (MCSS) covering 31 London 
boroughs (one borough, Sutton, did not properly record crimes during this period and 
had to be dropped) which is available from October 1994 to March 1997. We divide 
each day into four six hour windows starting at 6 A.M. Almost all matches start either 
at 3 P.M. or 8 P.M. and consequently fall near the middle of the second and third six 
hour window of the day defined. To identify a match effect on local criminal activity 
one also can exploit the variation in location and timing of both home and away 
games. Since we have extensive information on each game, we will focus our 
attention on the impact of the large variations in attendance for our identification, 
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controlling for weather conditions and whether the game is played on a public holiday 
day. We also include a whole set of controls to net out the possible influence of other 
matches taking place at the same time as well as the distance of each borough to the 
stadium hosting a home game and the distance of each away match. We check how 
the results are affected by controlling for the type of game being played and the 
outcome of each match as these factors could influence the three effects we seek to 
identify differently. Finally we consider the issue of possible temporal displacement 
of criminal activity before and after games. This is important for two reason: first 
crime rates have been shown to be serially correlated (Jacobs et al. 2007) and second, 
post event criminal activity of an audience could change for psychological reasons 
(Dahl and DellaVigna 2009 and Card and Dahl 2011). In all the models we estimate 
we include borough, hour window, day of the week, month, and football season fixed 
effects to account for unobserved time- and location-specific factors that may be 
correlated with matches and crime. 
  We find that the level of property crime increases by roughly 4 percent and falls 
by about 3 percent for every extra 10,000 supporters attending respectively a home 
and an away game. Following our conceptual framework we conclude that 
displacement of police is the factor that contributes most to the rise in property crime, 
likely because opportunistic offenders in the under protected areas of the borough take 
advantage of the smaller detection probability. We also conclude that voluntary 
incapacitation can explain the drop in criminal activity observed when attendance to 
away matches increases. We find no measureable impact on violent crime in the local 
community except during a derby match (i.e. when London teams play each other). 
This suggests some effect of concentration during those matches which are reputedly 
the ones with the highest levels of animosity between rival fans. As for displacement 
of crime, there are some signs that violence increases in the period after home games 
with attendance. This is again consistent with some level of hooligan behaviour 
between opposing fans after games. We then consider the difference in coefficients 
between home and away attendance on crime for up to 8 time periods before and after 
a match. We see then that only differences in property crime with changes in 
attendance are statistically significant. This leads us to downplay the importance of 
temporal displacement resulting from sporting events.  
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These results lead us to conclude that, assuming that voluntary incapacitation has 
a relatively similar impact during home and away games, the displacement of police 
forces during football matches increases property crime in London by almost 7 
percentage points for every extra 10,000 fans attending a game. This is in line with a 
growing body of evidence that police presence has an important effect on reducing 
crime. It also raises important issues of the negative impact of policing of private 
sporting events at the cost of the local communities wellbeing. It finally demonstrates 
the importance of considering all the direct and indirect channels which may influence 
crime when investigating such issues.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section presents a 
conceptual framework for understanding and identifying the match-crime relationship. 
Section 3 describes the data and the estimation strategy used for the analysis. Section 
4 presents and discusses the results. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Understanding and Identifying the Match-Crime Relationship 
 
2.1 - Conceptual Framework 
 
There are three channels through which we expect sporting events to influence crime 
in the local community: concentration, displacement, and incapacitation.  We describe 
in detail each of their likely respective impact below. 
 
2.1.1 Concentration 
 
Concentration is the most obvious channel linking sporting events and crime: the 
geographical proximity of fans from teams with long standing rivalries is likely to 
increase the number of volatile interaction between them. In its most extreme form 
this can lead to the extreme levels of hooligan violence observed during European 
football matches in the 1980’s. More generally we expect that concentration could, on 
average, increase the incidence of violent offences in the communities which are 
hosting a game as shown by Rees and Schepnel (2009) during American Football 
matches in college towns and by Campaniello (2013) in cities hosting games during 
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the 1990 FIFA World Cup in Italy. When games are played away, it is on the contrary 
very unlikely that concentration will affect crime in the areas where the teams 
originally come from.  
In the context of large sporting events the potential numbers of violent 
interactions will increase with attendance levels. It could also depend on a game’s 
outcome which may affect the emotional state of fans to a point of modifying their 
gain-loss utility perception of participation in violence. Card and Dahl (2011) for 
example showed that family violence increased after a local American Football team 
suffered an upset loss (i.e. team was largely odds on favourite to win but loses). 
Finally, the probability of volatile interactions may also increase with higher levels of 
rivalry between fans such as during derby games featuring teams from the same city. 
It is likely that these parameters will be taken into account when local authorities 
when planning the level of police personnel to deploy around stadiums during each 
home game. This leads us to consider the possible impact of police displacement 
during sporting events on local crime activity. 
 
2.1.2 Displacement 
 
There is a growing literature looking at the police-crime relationship using terrorism 
related events since they sometimes induce a surge in police presence in particular 
locations (Di Tella and Schargrodsky, 2004 and Draca et al. 2011). Exploiting the 
resulting unexpected displacement in law enforcement personnel is an interesting 
strategy to measure the impact the police may have on criminal activity. In the case of 
football matches in England there is also a large increase in police presence around a 
particular location: the stadiums. However this increase is not the result of unexpected 
consequences such as a terrorist attack. Consequently one could assume that with 
proper planning the effect of concentrating police at the stadium should be minimal, 
and displacement in the area could be avoided.  
However, there is documented evidence of a substantial amount of displacement 
occurring during matches. A report commissioned by the Metropolitan Police 
Authority (MPA) on the impact of policing football games in London concluded that: 
“On an average Saturday, 500 officers are lost to their communities policing football 
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matches throughout the MPA…Football costs the MPA £7.4M in police staffing 
alone” (MPA, 2003). These estimated 500 officers represent about 7 percent of the 
police manpower working in London on an average Saturday being deployed to 
monitor football matches instead of their regular duties. This is a relatively high level 
of regular displacement, with potentially a lot of variation around this mean, 
considering that it compares to the exceptional 34 percent local surge in police after 
the terrorist attacks of July 7 2005 in London (Draca et al. 2011).   
The MPA report also gives evidence on the large difference in the cost in terms 
of number of officers deployed at matches depending on the police risk classification 
of the game played (unfortunately not publically available). These costs almost double 
when the risk increases with the expected level of attendance at a game and the type 
of match which will be played.  We exploit the variation in crowd attendance at 
football matches as a proxy for the level of police displacement. The type of game 
played, regular championship or knockout competition, is also of interest since 
policing strategy for the latter cannot be as accurately planned as those matches only 
occur in the event of a win from the local team at each stage of a competition. Note 
finally that displacement only occurs during home games and that it theoretically 
could equally affect violent and property crime in the under protected areas of the 
communities hosting matches.     
 
2.1.3 Incapacitation 
 
Incapacitation is the general term used to express that individuals who are 
incarcerated or otherwise monitored cannot commit crimes in the community. More 
recently this definition has expended to other activities in which potential offenders 
engage more or less voluntarily, keeping them from committing crimes. The impact of 
self-incapacitation on offending behaviour has been investigated in the context of 
school attendance and juvenile crime (Jacob and Lefgren, 2003) and violent movie 
frequentation and the incidence of violence (Dahl and DellaVigna, 2009). In both 
cases the authors point out that these activities are undertaken by sub-samples of the 
population which have relatively high propensities of committing crime: the young 
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and the potentially violent. Can we argue that the same selection is occurring for 
individuals choosing to attend football matches? 
 There is little information on who football fans who attend games are apart for 
some basic demographic characteristics. Still, one of the most widely documented 
factor explaining the probability of individuals’ criminal behaviour is linked to their 
gender and age profile (Hirshi and Gottferdson 1983 and Hansen 2003). UK arrest 
data shows that 85 percent of arrested offenders are male and 80 percent are under 30 
years old. Surveys of English football supporters (Williams 1997) show that over 50 
percent of them are under 30 years of age and  nine out of ten are male. This is 
evidence of the strong demographic similarities between the football fan and the 
crime committing population. This does not imply that supporters are systematically 
potential offenders. It suggests that as the attendance and importance of a game grows 
it is increasingly likely that it will incapacitate certain individuals which would have 
otherwise been involved in criminal activity. 
We assume here that voluntary incapacitation will impact on property and violent 
crime in a similar way. More importantly we argue that incapacitation influences 
criminal behaviour during both home and away games. Note that away attendance 
may mostly vary because of the size of the fan base of the opposite team but it is also 
likely that more London supporters will try and see their team play bigger rivals. This 
is supported by the afore mentioned fan surveys which show that fans attempt to 
travel to as many away games as possible, especially larger teams, or will at least 
watch the television broadcast of the match (we have collected game viewing figures 
for this paper but as less than 1 percent of matches used here – 92 out of the 1,147 – 
were televised and using this information did not improve the analysis). One other 
important characteristic of football fans is that two thirds of them report that they are 
born locally (within 20 miles of where their team plays). This is important:  if we 
want to attribute changes in borough crime rates to incapacitation of potential local 
criminals, matches must attract fans who also reside in the area. To assess the 
incapacitation impact of a match we exploit the variation in attendance levels to each 
game, which captures the variation in the degree of incapacitation.  
 
2.2 – Identification Strategy 
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We summarise the impact of the three potential channels - concentration, 
displacement, and incapacitation - through which sporting events potentially affect 
crime in Figure 1.  The direction in which sporting events may impact on area crime 
rates is represented (increase ↑, decrease ↓, no effect →) for the three potential effects 
by type of offences depending if local team is playing a home or an away game. This 
depiction of the conceptual framework makes it clear for example that a decrease in 
property or violent crime during an away game can be attributed to some level of 
incapacitation. Increases in property crime during home games would be interpreted 
as the effect of police displacement being stronger than the incapacitation effect. An 
estimate of the net displacement effect on property crime can be estimated by 
comparing the impact of home and away games on such offences. Finally, a measure 
of the impact of concentration can be obtained by comparing the change in property 
and violent crimes during home games.  
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
We return later to the interpretation of separate estimates for each of the effects 
we are interested in. First we present the simple model, equation (1), we will use to 
identify the match-crime relationship : 
         
(1) 
 
where C is a measure of criminal activity (number of property or violent offences 
recorded) at time t in area a. α is an area level fixed effect, and τ a set of time specific 
controls (football season, month, day of the week and six hour time window). Home 
and Away are binary variable which take the value one or zero if the team from area a 
is respectively playing a match at home or away.  HomeAtt and AwayAtt represent the 
corresponding attendance levels to each of these matches. The   coefficients will 
therefore capture the home and away match effects in the boroughs concerned. Our 
real interest lies in the identification of the β coefficients which will be estimates of 
at
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the direction of the variations in attendance on the direction of the effects summarised 
in Figure 1.  
To improve our estimation of the match-crime relationship we also consider a 
number of other factors which may influence both game attendance and offending 
simultaneously. The first obvious candidate is the weather which has been proven to 
change crime patterns (Jacobs, Lefgren, and Moretti [2007]) and is also likely to have 
an impact on match attendance. We therefore include weather controls in our model 
measuring daily temperatures and rain falls in London. The day and the hour at which 
a match is played could also be important. Crime is not evenly distributed during the 
day and across days of the week. The fans attending afternoon or evening games may 
also be different and this may change from one season to the next depending on the 
successes of each team. To attempt and capture all these concerns we include 
(borough*period of the day*day of the week*month*season) fixed effects in our 
models. Finally our first model should include a public holiday indicator since such 
days may also lead to changes in attendance and crime patterns simultaneously. 
Other factors which could influence our estimation strategy include: i) the 
number of home and away game being played at the same time by the 9 London 
teams we consider which could have an impact on the levels of police displacement 
and voluntary incapacitation that go beyond just the match and attendances we 
measure for a single borough; ii) the distance of each London borough to the one 
where the local team is playing a home game to capture possible geographical 
displacement effects. Related to this we also may be concerned that the attendance to 
away games will differ depending on the distance of the host team. We therefore 
include distance in kilometres to the away game in the models we will estimate for 
various crime categories. 
The type of match and the outcome of a game could also influence crime. We 
control for the game having been lost when it was expected to be won using pre-
match betting odds to test this hypothesis in our context. We also include controls for 
the goal difference, number of yellow and red cards received during the game, and the 
match being a derby. We argue that these characteristics of a football match could 
incite changes in fan behaviour not captured by the size of the crowd attending a 
game. A last element of interest for our identification is to see if there is a differential 
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impact of matches on crime if the games were scheduled on short notice. This would 
be reflected by the impact on local crime of football matches changing as teams move 
further up a knockout competition. We test this assumption by including at which 
round of a competition the game being played belongs. All these factors which may 
influence the match-crime relationship described above are included as a set of 
control included in Z in equation (1).  
 
2.3 - Temporal Displacement 
 
The extensive modelling strategy we describe should enable us to reliably estimate the 
contemporaneous impact of football matches on local area crime. Still it will not 
account for possible temporal displacement of criminal activity.  This is especially 
important in the context of analysing violent crime as rival supporters may prefer to 
engage in aggressive behaviour before or after matches. There are two reasons for 
this. First they may choose to focus on the sport during the match or in other words 
prefer voluntary incapacitation over engaging in violent interaction at that time. 
Second, the risks of detection are the highest in the vicinity of stadiums during the 
match because of the large number of police forces deployed there. We therefore re-
estimate equation (1) but with lagged and forward crime as the dependent variable.  
We also investigate how property crime is affected in the time periods 
surrounding matches. Let us make the assumption that individuals choose to make an 
optimal number of crime, for example one, each day for financial reasons. If this 
offender is voluntarily incapacitated during a match because he is following it, he will 
decide to commit the property crime at another moment during that day. On the 
contrary, if this criminal is an opportunistic one, he will choose to commit the 
property offence while police are displaced during a game. The first example would 
increase property crime before or after matches while the second one would reduce 
this type of criminal activity outside the game period. The main point here is that the 
aggregate number of property crimes in a borough would then not change during the 
entire day. The game effect would only distort the time at which they occur. Another 
concern is the possibility of offenders coordinating future crimes while they are 
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together at matches. In this case the quantity of offences would increase in the periods 
following games more than by the normal daily aggregated level of crime. 
Finally, to investigate the possibility of time displacement further we also extend 
our period of investigation to plus and minus eight six hour periods before and after 
games. We chose to graphically present the difference between the home and away 
attendance coefficients (β1 – β2) on both property and violent crime for all 17 periods. 
This will, following our conceptual framework, give direct estimates of the net police 
displacement and net concentration effects of football matches on crime.  
 
 
3.  Data 
 
3.1- Football Data  
 
We have collected information for all matches for the nine London football teams 
present in the top two divisions of English football (the Premier League and the First 
Division) from October 1994 to March 1997 with the help of the Association of 
Football Statistician. The teams are Arsenal, Charlton Athletics, Chelsea, Crystal 
Palace, Millwall, Queens Park Rangers, Tottenham Hotspurs, West Ham United, and 
Wimbledon. As can be seen in Figure 2, these teams have their home stadiums located 
in seven of the 31 boroughs of London. The teams located in the same boroughs 
always alternate home and away matches when playing at the same time which 
therefore does not pose problems for our modelling strategy. We have a total of  1,147 
games played by our nine London  teams during this time period. We drop from the 
data days which fall out of the football season which runs from mid-August to mid-
May.  
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
Figure 3 shows the levels of attendance for each of the nine London teams with 
the top panel for home games and the bottom panel for away matches. The average 
attendance level across team for this period is roughly 20,000 spectators for both 
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types of games. However the Figures show how this varies greatly between teams and 
also from one match to the next. This is an important feature for our identification 
strategy which relies on changes in attendance levels across time.  
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
For each match we have detailed information on its type and outcome. We have 
the final score and goal difference for each match. We use the predicted outcome of 
each game by bookmakers (based on the Elo ratings system) to classify if a game was 
an upset loss or not. For the matches which are competitions - i.e. not regular schedule 
games part of the national championship -, we have up to ten rounds to reach a final. 
We gathered information on the number of yellow and red cards handed out by the 
referee during each game. We know the location of away matches and use it to 
estimate the distance fans have to travel.  
Table 1 reports the main summary statistics for these matches and shows an 
almost even distribution between home and away games in our sample. Although 
most games are played on Saturday afternoon the distribution is still relatively 
dispersed with for example 17 percent of matches on Wednesday evenings. The 
distribution is also quite evenly distributed across borrows where the major London 
football teams are located. Finally, a significant number of matches are derbies (7%), 
competitions (17%), and upset losses (5%) which will be useful for our identification 
of the various effects these games could have on crime.   
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
3.2 – Crime Data  
 
The football data was matched at the borough level to hourly recorded crime from the 
Metropolitan Criminal Statistics System (MCSS). The database includes all crimes 
recorded in London by the police and contains information on the borough where the 
offence took place and the estimated time at which it was committed. We can 
differentiate between property (burglaries, theft and handling of stolen goods, and 
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criminal damage) and violent (violence against the person, sexual offences, and 
robberies) crime categories. This is to our knowledge the most geographically detailed 
and high frequency crime data available in the UK for this period. We generate from 
the timing of crime information four equal six hours periods which run from 6 A.M. 
one day to the same hour on the following day. The six hours window was chosen 
because this is the time officers are assigned to a home match (House of Commons 
Home Affairs Committee, 2009) and would accounts for the appropriate time during 
which there is within borough police displacement. A football game lasts more or less 
two hours and the six hours window therefore also captures the two hours before and 
after a match when a potential offender could be incapacitated with pre- and post-
match activities. 
  
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Table 2 reports the mean number of crimes recorded for different categories in 
the seven boroughs where football teams are located. It shows the statistic by period 
of the day and whether there was no game, a home game, or an away game in the 
borough. We can see that most crimes recorded are property crimes and that the levels 
are much higher for this category during the afternoon rather than the evening hours. 
The large standard deviations suggest large variations in the number of recorded 
offences across periods and areas. The over-dispersion of the number of crimes 
committed is a common feature of area level crime data at high frequency. It is thus 
important, from an econometric standpoint, to use an estimation strategy that takes 
into account the particular distribution of our data. 
 
3.3 - Estimation Strategy 
 
While the simplest methodology is to estimate ordinary least-squares (OLS) models 
using the number of recorded crime, this strategy has several problems. Because 
criminal incidents are positively skewed, it is common to transform the data using log 
or log rates. However, because we are using six-hourly data for individual boroughs 
there are a non-trivial number of zeros in the data complicating the use of log rates, 
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particularly when focusing on individual crime categories (there are 3.4 percent hour-
window/borough cells when no property crimes were recorded but almost 37.5 
percent with no violent crimes reported). In order to address this concern we use a 
negative binomial regression model first developed by Greenwood and Yule (1920). It 
is a generalisation of the Poisson regression model that allows for the variance of the 
outcome measure to differ from the mean, making it appropriate for count data with 
over-dispersion. In view of the panel structure of our data we want to allow for both 
the possibility of permanent unobserved area effects as well as the possibility that 
these area effects are correlated with matches and other explanatory variables. We 
therefore use the fixed effects negative binomial developed by Hausman et al. (1984) 
which assumes that Poisson parameter λat follows a gamma distribution with 
parameters (γ, δ) and specifies γ = eXatβ with δ common both across areas and across 
time. We will throughout estimate the following negative binomial distribution: 
 
pr(𝐶𝑎𝑡) =  
Γ(𝛾𝑎𝑡 + 𝐶𝑎𝑡)
Γ(𝛾𝑎𝑡)Γ(𝐶𝑎𝑡 + 1)
(
𝛿
1 + 𝛿
)
𝛾𝑎𝑡
(1 + 𝛿)−𝐶𝑎𝑡 (2) 
 
The coefficients we will derive from equation (2) represent the effects of the 
independent variables on the log of the mean incidence and can therefore be 
interpreted as the percentage effect of the independent variables on crime.  
 There are only seven boroughs in our data which will be identifying game 
attendance ‘treatment’ as their local teams are playing home or away which raises the 
question of the validity of using the other 24 London areas which for our analysis. 
There are two reasons why it seems appropriate to keep all the available boroughs in 
our analysis. First is simply that although the areas with no teams will not contribute 
to the identification of our estimates of the game attendance coefficients, they do help 
us to estimate the other covariates with greater precision. The fixed effect nature of 
our models also guarantees that we are estimating match attendance impacts on crime 
within borough that are not be affected by using the areas with no local football 
teams. The second reason is our concern with potential spatial displacement issues: 
the possibility that areas without a local team may be affected by match attendance in 
other boroughs. Fan concentration, police displacement, and voluntary incapacitation 
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may impact on the criminal activity of these areas although in a way which is difficult 
to conceptually describe. We can however assume that if there such an indirect impact 
should be stronger for boroughs closer rather than further away from treated areas. 
This is why we have included controls for measures distances to boroughs with home 
and away games in our models.  
 
4.  Results 
 
4.1 – Changes in Crime During Matches 
 
The first results in column (1) of Table 3 present negative binomial regression 
estimates with fixed effects, holiday and weather controls in which the dependent 
variable is the total number of recorded crimes. We build up from this model and add 
sequentially dummies for number of other games in column (2), total attendance level 
at those games in column (3), and finally distance measures for each borough to areas 
hosting a match and distance to away games played by a local team in column (4). 
The main finding is that we observe throughout a positive and significant home 
attendance effects. The coefficient on the home game dummy is significant once we 
control for information about other London team’s matches and captures the raw 
impact of hosting a match on the crime rate in a borough. Our identification stems 
from the variations in attendance and we see in column (4) that an extra 10,000 fans at 
a home game lead to a 4 percent increase in crime. We find so far no impact of away 
attendance levels on criminal activity. The importance of considering different 
offence categories is highlighted in columns (5) and (6) which report results for 
property and violent crimes. We find that all the match effect on crime we observe 
comes from changes in the recorded property offences. There is also now a significant 
decrease in the numbers of property crimes committed when a local team is playing 
away suggesting some level of incapacitation as attendance to those games grows.  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
 16 
We consider more detailed crime categories in the results reported in Table 4. 
The results show that all the home and away game effects on property offences stems 
from the number of thefts committed during matches. There is no sign of changes in 
burglaries and importantly, criminal damage, which could be argued to be an atypical 
property crime that may increase as a result of the concentration effect. Also we still 
find no evidence of changes in violent crimes apart from the home game ‘intercept’ is 
now marginally significant. The increase in the number of recorded thefts almost 
entirely comes from changes in thefts from and of motor vehicles and thefts from 
shops but not from thefts from the person (which would be recorded as a robbery if 
any threat or violence was used). This evidence is very useful for us to reject a 
potential fourth channel in which football matches could impact on local crime by 
increasing the number of potential victims. This supply side mechanism does not hold 
as shops and motor vehicles (all stadiums have adjoined car parks and most fans use 
public transport) are in relative constant supply in comparison to the massive change 
in number of individuals who could be targeted during a game, the kind of crime for 
which we see no effect. We therefore interpret the strong coefficients associated with 
the theft category during home and away match attendance as a sign that a 
combination of displacement and voluntary incapacitation is at play in the match-
crime relationship.  
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
Results from models which include a large number of information on matches 
outcome and type are reported in Table 5. We still observe our main finding of 
increases (decreases) of property crimes as attendance to home (away) games grows. 
However all the other game controls we include do not appear to change the levels of 
property offences committed during matches. This is also what we find for almost all 
the match outcome and type variables we add to the model for violent crime.  We are 
more surprised by this result since we assumed many of these match outcome controls 
could have psychological influence over fan violent behaviour. The most interesting 
result in Table 5 is the large and significant increase in violence when an area is 
hosting a derby game. This suggests that concentration could play a role in increasing 
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the number of violent interactions but only when the level of rivalry between 
opposing fans is high.  
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
4.2 – Changes in Crime Before/After Matches 
 
We now turn to considerations of possible temporal displacement of criminal activity 
in Table 6. These tables report results from the same model as Table 5 but for the six-
hour periods just before and just after each game. The first four columns of Table 6 
show that during these time windows there does not appear to be any game attendance 
impact on property crimes. This confirms that there is no time displacement in 
property offences over a match day and that the changes estimated previously during a 
match are absolute increases (during home games) and decreases (during away 
games). The picture for violent crime is different and the results are reported in the 
last four columns of Table 6. The number of recorded violent offences increase by 10 
percent for every 10,000 extra fans after home matches. This is again a net increase 
over the day as we did not observe a matching decrease in crime over the other time 
periods. This is evidence that the voluntary incapacitation of potential offenders ends 
after a game and leaves way for the violent encounters predicted by the concentration 
effect. 
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
Limiting possible temporal displacement to only the short time window around a 
game may not capture all the distortionary it may have on crime. Jacobs et al. (2007) 
showed that extreme weather shocks inversely displace crime in the following week. 
We therefore consider the possibility of a match effect up to 8 periods before and after 
games. The conceptual framework we designed to identify the various channels of the 
match-crime relationship (Figure 1) indicates that we can obtain estimates of the net 
displacement and net concentration effects by comparing the home (β1) and away (β2) 
game attendance effects for respectively property and violence offences. We therefore 
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compute estimates of the difference in attendance coefficients (β1 – β2) from the for 
the 17 six-hour periods of interest. The generated estimates are reported with +/- two 
standard errors in Figures 4 for property (top graph) and violent (bottom graph) 
crimes. The difference in game attendance effect during a match is at 0 on the axis 
with preceding and following six hour time windows going from -8 to +8. We find 
that the estimated effect is only statistically significant for property offences at the 
time when a match is taking place. The lack of any other effect identified for the 
difference of the home and game attendance coefficients leads us to several 
conclusions. First there appears not to be any noticeable temporal displacement of 
property or violent offence as a result of football matches. Second the observed 
increase in violence just after home matches is not precisely estimated enough to be 
significant. Finally the main finding from this research remains the important 
estimated contemporaneous increases in local property crime resulting from hosting 
large sporting events.  
 
[Figures 4 about here] 
 
4.3 Changes in Crime: Which of the Three Channels? 
 
Following our conceptual framework we are able to distinguish between three 
channels (concentration, incapacitation, and displacement) by which football matches 
may impact on local crime rate. There are some signs of a concentration effect but 
only just after a home match was played where we observed increases in violent 
crime. The voluntary incapacitation effect on property crime during matches is 
estimated from the negative coefficient of away attendance at -.003.  
Assuming a relatively similar level of incapacitation effect per supporter during 
home games, we are able to identify the net police displacement effect. This is 
equivalent to taking the (β1 – β2) coefficients at period zero in Table 5 gives us -.007 
with an associated standard error of .002. It translate into property crime increases of 
7 percent in a borough hosting a home game for every 10,000 extra fans attending and 
this is mainly of result of the displacement of law enforcement personnel policing the 
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event. In absolute term this represents an extra 1.5 property crimes committed in a 
borough hosting a match during the six-hour period around the game. 
  
5. Conclusion 
 
We show in this paper that the impact large sporting events may have on criminal 
activity is more complex than the simple effect they could have on the violent 
behaviour of fans. We develop a conceptual framework to understand the match-
crime relationship which considers all the direct and indirect effects sporting events 
may have on offending behaviour. We describe three possible channels which are the 
geographical concentration of rival fans, the displacement of police personnel, and the 
voluntary incapacitation of potential offenders. Making simple assumptions we are 
able to determine the likely impact of each of these effects on local area crime during 
home and away games on property and violent crime. We the attempt to identify them 
separately by exploiting the variation in attendance to games from nine London teams 
located in seven different boroughs of the city. 
Perhaps surprisingly, considering the amount of anecdotal evidence on the 
aggressive behaviour, we do not uncover any effect of football matches on area 
violent crime. There is however some evidence that the number of violent interactions 
is more frequent when the rivalry between opposite supporters is higher. The results 
also suggest that if the concentration effect is responsible for increases in violent 
crime, it is only in the hours after the game is over. This could be explained by the 
displacement and incapacitation effects only impacting on criminal behaviour during 
matches. However this evidence is relatively weak and we do not believe that football 
matches in London contribute to substantial changes in violent behaviour. 
The main finding of this research is that home game attendance significantly 
increases property crime in the borough hosting the event. On the contrary when 
teams are playing away, an inverse relationship is observed with property crime 
dropping as away attendance increases. We find no evidence of inter-temporal 
substitution of property crime even after extending the sample period of analysis to up 
to two days before and after the event. We calculate that voluntary incapacitation is 
responsible of a drop of 3 percent in the incidence of property crimes in a team home 
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borough for every extra 10,000 fans attending an away match. Using this estimate we 
are able to evaluate a net police displacement effect of 7 percentage point increase in 
property crimes in the host community.   
These findings show how crucial it is to distinguish between the different 
channels though which certain events may impact on criminal behaviour. In our case, 
how important is the effect on crime of the incapacitation of the potential thieves 
attending a match relative to the displacement of police to the stadium. These results 
will also fuel the ongoing public policy debate about who should ‘pay for police’ 
during football matches in the UK. They do not however clearly answer this question 
since reduced property crime levels during away games could be seen as socially 
beneficial although one could argue that it is only displacing the cost to other 
communities.  
More importantly, the surprising result of no changes in violent behaviour during 
matches – except during derbies where the emotional state of fans is arguably the ‘the 
most volatile – suggests that the high levels of police deployed is successful in 
containing group violence behaviour. Indeed, recent research by Poutvaara and Priks 
(2009) and Priks (2014) has shown that good policing practices in stadium have a 
strong impact on hooligan violence. One could therefore conclude to some social 
benefits of the police being displaced to stadiums although this should of course not 
be at the cost to the rest of the community. This is especially true in large 
metropolitan areas where resources are so stretched that it may be difficult to control 
both crowds at stadiums and guarantee law and order in other parts of the city.  
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Football Matches  
 
 Number of 
Games 
Fraction 
of Games 
All Games 1147 1 
   
Home Games 571 .502 
Away Games 576 .499 
   
London Derbies 81 .071 
Competitions 98 .172 
Upset Losses 53 .046 
   
Saturdays (12-18h) 616 .537 
Sunday (12-18h) 107 .093 
Other Days (12-18h) 60 .052 
Wednesday (18-00h) 193 .168 
Tuesday (18-00h) 114 .099 
Other Days (18-00h) 57 .050 
   
Croydon  263 .229 
Greenwich 131 .114 
Hammersmith 247 .215 
Haringey 121 .106 
Islington 134 117 
Lewisham 134 .117 
Newham 117 .102 
 
Note: Summary statistics for the 1147 games played by the 9 London teams 
between October 1994 and March 1997. Upset losses are defined as the 
home team losing at a home or away game although the advantage in terms 
of Elo ratings was > 100.  
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Table 2: Mean Number of Crimes per Hour Window  
 Mean Number of Crimes 
(Standard Deviations) 
 
12 to 18 Hours  18 to 00 Hours 
No 
Game 
Home 
Game 
Away 
Game 
 
No 
Game 
Home 
Game 
Away 
Game 
All Crimes 
29.48 
(11.81) 
30.99 
(13.85) 
29.13 
(13.24) 
 
20.37 
(8.76) 
21.83 
(8.93) 
20.13 
(9.68) 
Property Crimes 
 20.94 
(8.85) 
23.70 
(11.04) 
21.60 
(10.61) 
 
12.06 
(5.55) 
14.36 
(5.76) 
12.45 
(5.63) 
Burglaries 
6.48 
(4.07) 
6.65 
(4.41) 
6.52 
(4.08) 
 
4.16 
(3.06) 
3.85 
(2.59) 
3.82 
(2.89) 
Thefts 
14.25 
(6.69) 
16.79 
(8.61) 
14.89 
(8.33) 
 
7.65 
(3.98) 
10.27 
(4.58) 
8.41 
(3.93) 
Criminal Damage 
0.20 
(0.57) 
0.26 
(0.74) 
0.18 
(0.48) 
 
0.24 
(0.61) 
0.25 
(0.51) 
0.23 
(0.54) 
Violent Crimes 
7.40 
(5.56) 
6.28 
(5.22) 
6.63 
(5.64) 
 
7.15 
(5.37) 
6.35 
(5.10) 
6.86 
(5.90) 
Violence 
3.86 
(3.97) 
3.72 
(3.77) 
3.82 
(4.17) 
 
4.26 
(4.32) 
3.90 
(4.00) 
4.18 
(4.21) 
Sexual offences 
0.34 
(1.09) 
0.24 
(0.84) 
0.22 
(0.81) 
 
0.30 
(0.97) 
0.19 
(0.74) 
0.27 
(0.97) 
Robberies 
3.20 
(1.17) 
2.32 
(3.04) 
2.59 
(3.34) 
 
2.59 
(2.96) 
2.26 
(3.13) 
2.41 
(3.27) 
Sample 5,007 391 392  5,315 180 184 
 
Note: The reported means are generated from the 7 boroughs which are home to one of the 9 teams 
since there are no equivalent for the home and away columns for the other boroughs.  
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Table 3: Impact of Home and Away Games and Attendance Levels  
on Total Number, Property, and Violent Crimes Reported to the Police 
  
 
Dependent Variables  = 
Number of Crimes Reported 
 All Crimes Property Violent 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Home Game Dummy .009 
(.033) 
.054* 
(.033) 
.086** 
(.040) 
.084** 
(.040) 
.136*** 
(.041) 
.104 
(.095) 
Home Game Attendance 
(in Thousands) 
.003* 
(.002) 
.003* 
(.002) 
.004** 
(.002) 
.004** 
(.002) 
.004** 
(.002) 
.002 
(.004) 
Away Game Dummy 
-.023 
(.031) 
.019 
(.032) 
-.008 
(.038) 
-.020 
(.042) 
-.011 
(.040) 
.055 
(.092) 
Away Game Attendance 
(in Thousands) 
-.000 
(.001) 
-.001 
(.001) 
-.001 
(.001) 
-.002 
(.002) 
-.004** 
(.002) 
.002 
(.004) 
       
Dummy Number of Other  
Home and Away Games 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Attendance to Other Home 
and Away Games 
No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Distance from Borough  of 
Home and to Away Games  
No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Holiday Indicator Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Rain and Temperature Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Borough * Hour * Day of 
the Week * Month * Season 
Fixed Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 43,896 43,896 43,896 43,896 43,896 43,896 
 
Notes: An observation is a six hour period 12 to 18 H or 18  to 00 H for the 31 London boroughs during the 
football season (mid –August to mid-May) between September 1994 and October 1997. The estimates come 
from negative binomial regressions, standard errors are in parenthesis. *, **, and *** respectively denote 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level.     
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Table 4: Impact of Home and Away Games  
and Attendance Levels on Various Types of Crimes Reported to the Police 
  
 
Dependent Variables  = 
Number of Crimes Reported for the Following Categories 
 Property Crime Violent 
 Theft Burglary 
Criminal  
Damage 
Violence Sexual Robbery 
Home Game Dummy .192*** 
(.046) 
.026 
(.073) 
.124 
(.263) 
.203* 
(.121) 
-.517 
(.428) 
.183 
(.145) 
Home Game Attendance 
(in Thousands) 
.006*** 
(.002) 
-.001 
(.003) 
.002 
(.011) 
.001 
(.005) 
.006 
(.017) 
-.008 
(.006) 
Away Game Dummy 
.040 
(.050) 
-.102 
(.074) 
.168 
(.290) 
.133 
(.119) 
-.263 
(.418) 
.005 
(.139) 
Away Game Attendance 
(in Thousands) 
-.006*** 
(.002) 
.002 
(.003) 
-.015 
(.012) 
.005 
(.005) 
-.020 
(.015) 
.003 
(.005) 
       
Other Games and  
Distance Controls 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Holiday and Weather 
Indicators 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Borough * Hour * Day of 
the Week * Month * 
Season Fixed Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 43,896 43,896 43,896 43,896 43,896 43,896 
 
Notes: An observation is a six hour period 12 to 18 H or 18 to 00 H for the 31 London boroughs during the 
football season (mid –August to mid-May) between September 1994 and October 1997. Other games and 
distance controls are: dummy for number of home and away games played by London teams at the same time; 
attendance level to other home and away games played by London teams at the same time; distance (in Km) of 
home game played to all London boroughs; and distance (in Km) from a team’s borough to away game played.      
The estimates come from negative binomial regressions, standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, and *** 
respectively denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level.  
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Table 5: Impact on Property and Violent Crime of Home and Away  
Games and Attendance Levels Controlling for Match Characteristics 
  
 
Dependent Variables  = 
Number of Crimes Reported  
 Property Crime Violent 
 Home Away Home Away 
Game Dummy .139*** 
(.042) 
.014 
(.047) 
.126 
(.097) 
.013 
(.097) 
Game Attendance 
.004** 
(.002) 
-.003* 
(.002) 
.001 
(.005) 
.002 
(.004) 
Lose Game Upset 
-.019 
(.079) 
-.087 
(.091) 
.127 
(.211) 
-.050 
(.231) 
Goal Difference 
.015 
(.019) 
-.000 
(.021) 
-.052 
(.051) 
-.023 
(.052) 
Number of Cards 
-.002 
(.008) 
-.008 
(.012) 
.005 
(.018) 
-.026 
(.031) 
London Derby 
-.005 
(.042) 
-.069 
(.052) 
.184* 
(.100) 
.168 
(.114) 
Competition Round 
-.001 
(.012) 
-.016 
(.012) 
-.035 
(.030) 
-.015 
(.025) 
Other Games and  
Distance Controls 
Yes Yes 
Holiday Indicator Yes Yes 
Rain and Temperature Yes Yes 
Borough * Hour * Day of 
the Week * Month *  
Season Fixed Effects 
Yes Yes 
Observations 43,896 43,896 
 
Notes: The Home and Away coefficients by crime type are estimated from the same model 
but reported next to each other for convenience. An observation is a six hour period between 
12 to 18 H or 18 to 00 H for the 31 London boroughs during the football season (mid –
August to mid-May) between September 1994 and October 1997. Other games and distance 
controls are: dummy for number of home and away games played by London teams at the 
same time; attendance level to other home and away games played by London teams at the 
same time; distance (in Km) of home game played to all London boroughs; and distance (in 
Km) from a team’s borough to away game played. The estimates come from negative 
binomial regressions, standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, and *** respectively denote 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level.     
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Table 6: Time Displacement of Crime – Impact of Home and Away Attendance Levels Controlling for Match Characteristics 
  
 
Dependent Variables  = Number of Property Crimes Reported 
 Property Crimes Violent Crimes 
 Before After Before After 
 Home Away Home Away Home Away Home Away 
Game Dummy -.021 
(.081) 
.011 
(.086) 
-.007 
(.081) 
.006 
(.084) 
.108 
(.123) 
-.065 
(.126) 
-.008 
(.121) 
.107 
(.131) 
Game Attendance 
.002 
(.004) 
-.003 
(.003) 
.003 
(.004) 
-.001 
(.003) 
.009 
(.006) 
.004 
(.005) 
.010* 
(.006) 
-.002 
(.005) 
Lose Game Upset 
.074 
(.180) 
-.054 
(.183) 
.077 
(.187) 
.081 
(.172) 
-.334 
(.296) 
-.365 
(.329) 
.030 
(.267) 
-.291 
(.278) 
Goal Difference 
-.031 
(.040) 
.019 
(.043) 
.054 
(.042) 
-.012 
(.045) 
-.073 
(.070) 
-.014 
(.069) 
.072 
(.056) 
-.046 
(.066) 
Number of Cards 
.009 
(.015) 
-.009 
(.023) 
.018 
(.014) 
-.028 
(.021) 
-.034 
(.024) 
-.023 
(.040) 
-.026 
(.023) 
-.018 
(.034) 
London Derby 
-.061 
(.088) 
.038 
(.095) 
-.040 
(.086) 
.033 
(.097) 
-.199 
(.143) 
.017 
(.145) 
-.158 
(.132) 
.029 
(.141) 
Competition Round 
.012 
(.003) 
-.015 
(.021) 
.033 
(.022) 
-.004 
(.021) 
-.021 
(.034) 
-.015 
(.031) 
-.021 
(.034) 
-.012 
(.032) 
Other Games and Distance Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Holiday and Weather Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Borough * Hour * Day of the Week * 
Month * Season Fixed Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 43,880 43,880 43,880 43,880 
 
Notes: The Home and Away coefficients by crime type are estimated from the same model but reported next to each other for convenience. An observation is a six 
hour period between 12 to 18 H or 18 to 00 H for the 31 London boroughs during the football season (mid –August to mid-May) between September 1994 and 
October 1997. Other games and distance controls are: dummy for number of home and away games played by London teams at the same time; attendance level to 
other home and away games played by London teams at the same time; distance (in Km) of home game played to all London boroughs; and distance (in Km) from 
a team’s borough to away game played. The estimates come from negative binomial regressions, standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, and *** respectively denote 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level.     
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Figure 1: Potential Direction of Displacement, Incapacitation, and Concentration  
Effects on Property and Violent Crimes during Home and Away Games 
 
Property Violent 
Home Away Home Away 
 Displacement ↑ → ↑ → 
 Incapacitation ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ 
 Concentration → → ↑ → 
 
Note: Upward and downward pointing arrows represent respectively positive and negative impact from each of 
the three channels - concentration, incapacitation, displacement- through which home or away sporting events 
may impact one local property or violent crime. The flat arrows suggest that we do not expect any effect during 
home or away games for the corresponding crime category.      
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Figure 2: Map of London Boroughs 
with Football Grounds and Associated Football Teams 
 
 Borough Team(s) 
1 Croydon Crystal Palace & Wimbledon 
2 Greenwich Charlton Athletics 
3 Hammersmith & Fulham QPR & Chelsea United 
4 Haringey Tottenham Hotspur 
5 Islington Arsenal 
6 Lewisham Millwall 
7 Newham West Ham United 
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Figure 3: Home and Away Match Attendance Levels by Football Team
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Figures 4: Estimated Displacement (Property Crime – Top Graph) and  
Concentration (Violent Crime – Bottom Graph) Effects  
of Football Matches for 8 Periods Before and After A Game 
 
Note: Each point represents the difference between the home and away attendance coefficients (β1 – β2) for 
regression on property crime in the top graph and violent crime in the bottom graph. These are shown with +/- 
two standard errors for the 8 six hour windows surrounding a match and for the game time itself at 0.  
Following our conceptual model presented in Figure 1, the property crime results are estimates of the net 
displacement effect of matches on property crime and the violent crime results are estimates of the net 
concentration effect.  
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